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Abstract - The domain of polyconvex sets, i.e. finite unions of convex, compact, Euclidean sets, is large 
enough to encompass most of the opportunity sets typically encountered in economic environments, 
including non-linear or even non-convex budget sets, and opportunity sets arising from production sets. We 
provide a characterization of the volume-ranking as defined on the set of all polyconvex sets, relying on a 
valuation-based volume-characterization theorem due to Klain and Rota (1997). 
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 1. Introduction
In the last decade, a signiﬁcant amount of work has been devoted to the task
of ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice in various settings in-
cluding standard economic environments. This paper contributes to this literature
by focusing on the volume-ranking of opportunity sets in Euclidean spaces and its
characterization.
Indeed, a ‘freedom of choice’-based ranking of opportunity sets should arguably
only take into account the ‘size’ of the relevant set, without making any use of
information about individual preferences which may be highly unreliable, costly to
acquire, or both.
1 In order to cope with standard economic environments we assume
that individual options can be represented by points in a n-dimensional Euclidean
space, and the problem of ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice
then reduces to comparing their respective sizes. Thus, the total-ordering induced
by volume is arguably a natural criterion if Euclidean opportunity sets are to be
ranked according to the freedom of choice they allow, regardless of any explicit
preferential information. Of course, the volume-ranking embodies an extremely
strong threshold eﬀect: a null endowment along any dimension forces indiﬀerence to
the empty set, which amounts to regarding all dimensions as ‘essential’ or ‘primary’
opportunities.2
As a matter of fact, the problem of characterizing the volume-ranking of linear
budget sets has been already addressed by Xu (2004). However, there are a few
good reasons which suggest that a larger Euclidean domain should be considered.
First, the Lancasterian approach to consumer theory in terms of characteristics of
goods requires non-linear (piecewise linear) budgets sets. Moreover, standard con-
sumer choice problems with several income tax rates induce non-convex budget sets
(see e.g. Mas-Colell et alii (1995)). Also, non-linear convex (or even non-convex)
opportunity sets arise whenever basic alternatives are taken to be production, as
opposed to consumption, programs. Finally, non-linear, convex, compact oppor-
tunity sets are typically met within game-theoretically oriented models such as
abstract economies and characteristic-outcome coalitional game forms. Therefore,
we propose to enlarge the domain of opportunity sets to the entire set polycon(n)
of polyconvex sets (i.e., of ﬁnite unions of convex, compact n-dimensional Euclidean
opportunity sets).
We provide a characterization of the volume-ranking of polyconvex opportunity
sets which takes advantage of the latticial structure of polycon(n) and exploits
Date: May 2, 2006.
Thanks are due to Uri Rothblum for helpful discussions and suggestions. The usual disclaimer
applies.
1Such a ‘freedom of choice’-based ranking might arguably also be relevant in order to deﬁne a
suitable “capability”-ordering of opportunity sets.
2See Kolm (2004) for a critical discussion of the volume-ranking and a tentative endorsement
of an alternative index-number oriented, distance-based ordering of budget sets.
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valuations, i.e. essentially real-valued additive functions on distributive lattices. In
particular, our result relies heavily on a basic characterization theorem for volume
(see Klain and Rota (1997)), and a classic theorem on extensive measurement (see
Krantz et alii (1971)). Our work is also closely related to a recent result on ratio-
scale representations of rankings of compact opportunity sets in the non-negative
orthant of an Euclidean space due to Pattanaik and Xu (2000). Our characterization
of the volume-ranking requires the introduction of two extra-axioms with respect
to the latter work, namely a full dimensionality requirement for non-bottom ranked
opportunity sets plus a translation invariance condition.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss the moti-
vations for extending to the entire domain of polycon(n) the analysis on ranking
opportunity sets in economic environments. Section 3 lays down our basic notation
and deﬁnitions. Section 4 presents our characterization of volume-ranking. We also
provide examples which show that each property satisﬁed by the volume-order is
independent from the others: in other words, our volume-characterization is tight.3
Section 5 contains some concluding remarks, while all the proofs are collected in
appendix.
2. Why polyconvex sets? Motivation and overview
As mentioned above, we focus on the entire family of polyconvex sets, i.e. ﬁnite
unions of convex and compact opportunity sets in Euclidean spaces, an inﬁnite set,
that encompasses most of the opportunity sets typically encountered in economic
context.
In order to motivate the choice of such a large domain let us provide a few
prominent examples which are rather commonly met in the economic literature.
To begin with, let us consider the Lancasterian characteristics-approach to con-
sumption theory (see Lancaster (1968)). Here, competitive budget sets are deﬁned
in a characteristics-space, namely the objects of consumer preferences are the prop-
erties or characteristics of goods. Therefore, the consumption level of each good
corresponds to a point in the characteristics space: the budget set is the convex set
having the origin and eﬃcient one good bundles as extreme points. The frontier of
that budget set is typically piecewise linear (see Figure 1.(a) for a representation
3It is worth remarking that we produce an example of a preordered set that violates the
Archimedean property, while satisfying all the other properties we have required in our character-
ization. Such an example also provides a solution to a similar independent problem left open by
Pattanaik and Xu (2000, pg. 61).3
of vectors of goods in a two-dimensional characteristic space).
Fig. 1: (a) Lancasterian and (b) Non-Linear Budget Sets
Let us now consider the budget set of a consumer in a standard two-goods com-
petitive economy where the goods are income (consumption goods) and leisure (see
Mas-Colell et alii (1995)). If three income tax-rates are in place, then the budget
sets are a piecewise linear frontier but typically not convex (see Figure 1.(b)).4
Next, consider production sets, i.e. the standard models of production technol-
ogy. Under non-increasing returns to scale the production set is typically a convex
but generally non-linear set (see Figure 3.(a)). By contrast, under non-decreasing
4It is worth noticing that, in a n-good economy with one indivisible good, the standard com-
petitive budget set could still be represented as a polyconvex set. However, such a budget set
would typically be n − 1-dimensional hence by deﬁnition equivalent to the null set according to
the volume-ranking or for that matter to any ranking induced by a simple valuation, as deﬁned
below.
Thus, while the Euclidean polyconvex domain also encompasses indivisible opportunities, it
should be emphasized that if one insists that indivisibilities are to be considered then the re-
quirement of Simplicity as deﬁned below namely indiﬀerence between the empty set and any
non-full-dimensional opportunity set must be deﬁnitely discarded as entirely inappropriate. In
the present paper, we follow the opposite route i.e. we implicitly disregard the ‘indivisibility’ case
and require Simplicity, leaving a proper investigation of the former -and broader- approach as a
topic for further research.4
returns to scale the production set may well be a non-convex set (see Figure 3.(b)).
Fig. 2: (a) Nonincreasing and (b) Nondecreasing Returns to Scale; (c) Production Set with Free Entry
Also, additive production sets, which are required in order to ensure free entry
(see Mas-Colell et alii (1995)), are typically non-convex sets (see Figure 3.(c)).
When limits on resources are superimposed on such production sets, non-linear
convex, respectively non-convex, polyconvex sets typically obtain (more precisely,
the projections on productions sets of the sets of globally feasible allocations, or
attainable states, are non-linear convex or non-convex polyconvex sets, respectively:
see e.g. Border (1985) Deﬁnition 20.2 pg.96).
Finally, one may consider opportunity sets arising in an interactive setting. A
ﬁrst prominent example of that situation occurs whenever the relevant opportunity
sets are values of sets of feasible outcomes for coalitions of players in a characteristic-
outcome coalitional game form. Coalitional game forms of this type have been
typically used to model certain coalition production economies. A characteristic-
outcome game form is an array G = hN,X,(XS)S⊆Ni where N is the ﬁnite player
set, X ⊆ Rnk with n = |N| and k the number of goods, and for any S, XS ⊆ Rns,
with s = |S|, is the feasible outcome set of coalition S. Those feasible sets are taken
to be convex and compact (see Border (1985) chapter 23), hence polyconvex.5
Another relevant example of interactive-based polyconvex opportunity sets is
provided by pseudogames or abstract economies as frequently met in general equilib-




where N is the player set, X is the outcome set, Si is the strategy set of player i,
Fi : Πi∈NSi →→ Siis the feasibility correspondence of player i (for any i ∈ N),
h : D ⊆ Πi∈NSi → X is the outcome function (where D denotes the set of all ﬁxed
points of the global feasibility correspondence F : Πi∈NSi →→ Πi∈NSi as deﬁned
by the rule F((si)i∈N)=Πi∈NFi((si)i∈N)),a n d<i⊆ X ×X is the preference rela-
tion of player i,w i t hi ∈ N. Notice that the values of a feasibility correspondence
Fi denote precisely the possible action choices open to player i given the choices
made by the other players. In fact, in standard general equilibrium applications the
values of consumers’ feasibility correspondences are the familiar linear budget sets,
while the constant value of the auctioneer’s feasibility correspondence is the price
simplex, a compact convex set in Euclidean space. However, the individual feasibil-
ity correspondences Fi are in general taken to be continuous correspondences with
general nonempty compact convex (hence possibly non-linear polyconvex) values in
an Euclidean space (see e.g. Border (1985), Theorem 19.8, page 91).
The foregoing list of examples, and, in particular, the inclusion of opportunity
sets arising from production sets, also provide a motivation for our interest in op-
portunity sets comprising points with possibly negative coordinates. Recall that
the points of a production set represent production programs where inputs are rep-
resented by negative components and outputs are denoted by positive components.
It should be noticed that our characterization theorem is easily adapted to
those restricted domains that result from excluding one or more orthants of the
n-dimensional real Euclidean space. On the other hand, we can hardly think of a
compact but not polyconvex set arising from standard economic or game-theoretic
models: that is one of the reasons why we do not allow the entire set of compact
Euclidean sets in our domain.5 Therefore, we shall focus on the full domain of
polyconvex sets in Rn without any further ado, and provide a characterization of
the volume-ranking in such a setting.
5An example of a non-polyconvex compact body is a standard torus (see ﬁg. 3).
Fig. 3: A Torus
Other possible examples of non-polyconvex compact bodies are polyhedra, with a possibly inﬁnite
number of holes, deﬁned as open n-dimensional balls.
Notice that, by contrast, Pattanaik and Xu (2000) consider the set of all compact subsets of
the nonnegative orthant Rn
+.6
3. Notation, definitions and preliminary results
We shall focus on the class of polyconvex sets in an Euclidean ﬁnite-dimensional
space.
Deﬁnition 1. Let Rn be a ﬁnite dimensional Euclidean space. A polyconvex set in
Rn is a ﬁnite union of compact and convex subsets of Rn.W ed e n o t eb ypolycon(n)
the set of all polyconvex sets of Rn.
Moreover, for any bounded set A ⊆ Rn the polyconvex hull of A is deﬁned as:
kpol(A)=∩{B ∈ polycon(n): A ⊆ B }.
The set polycon(n) can be endowed with a distributive latticial structure in a
very natural way by positing sup = ∪ (set-union) and inf = ∩ (set-intersection).
We shall denote Polycon(n) the distributive lattice (polycon(n),∪,∩).
In particular, we are concerned with the volume-induced preorder <V on polycon(n).
In order to deﬁne the volume on polycon(n),w eh a v et oi n t r o d u c eﬁrst orthogonal
parallelotopes. An orthogonal parallelotope is a rectilinear box A with sides parallel




+ : xi ≤ ki for i =1 ,...,n and ki > 0 for any i =1 ,...,n
ª
hence, an orthogonal parallelotope is described by n inequalities representing straight
line parallel to a selected frame. A parallelotope is a ﬁnite union or intersection of
orthogonal parallelotopes in an Euclidean space. We denote by par⊥ (n) the set of
all orthogonal parallelotopes and by par(n) the set of all ﬁnite unions and inter-
sections of orthogonal parallelotopes. It is easily checked that hpar(n),∪,∩i is a
distributive lattice.
The volume of an orthogonal parallelotope A,a sd e ﬁned above, is:
vol(A)=k1 · k2 · ... · kn.
The volume of a parallelotope B ∈ par(n) can be deﬁned recursively, by positing
vol(∅)=0and recalling that par⊥ (n) is closed under intersections and that for
any A1,A 2 ∈ par⊥ (n), vol(A1 ∪ A2)=vol(A1)+vol(A2)−vol(A1 ∩ A2). Finally,
t h ev o l u m eo fap o l y c o n v e xs e tK is:
vol(K)=s u p{vol(B):B ∈ par(n),B⊆ K}.
The volume-induced preorder <V on polycon(n) is deﬁned by the following rule:
A <V B ⇐⇒ vol(A) ≥ vol(B),
for all A,B ∈ polycon(n).
As mentioned above, we shall provide a very simple characterization of (polycon(n),<V )
in terms of latticial valuations. In order to do that, a few deﬁnitions are to be in-
troduced:
Deﬁnition 2. Let L =( L,∪,∩) be a lattice of sets. A (real-valued) valuation on
L is a function µ : L → R such that, for any A,B ∈ L,
µ(A ∪ B)=µ(A)+µ(B) − µ(A ∩ B).
(i): Av a l u a t i o nµ is isotone if, for any A,B ∈ L,i fA ⊇ B then µ(A) ≥
µ(B);7
(ii): Av a l u a t i o nµ on the lattice Polycon(n) is translation invariant if, for
any A ∈ L and for any translation τ on Rn, µ(τ[A]) = µ(A);6
(iii): A valuation µ on Polycon(n) is simple if µ(A)=0for any A ∈
polycon(n) such that dimA<n .
Valuations are a fundamental tool in geometry and are strictly connected to the
idea of measuring polygonal regions. Closely related to the concept of valuation is
that of dissection:
Deﬁnition 3. Let A be a (polyconvex) subset of Rn.A(polyconvex) dissection of A
is a ﬁnite set {B1,...,Bk} of (polyconvex) subsets of Rnsuch that A = B1∪B2...∪Bk
and int(Bi ∩ Bj)=∅, for any i,j =1 ,...,k,w i t hi 6= j.
A dissection involves the well-known notion of dividing complex geometric re-
gions into ﬁgures whose areas are given by more familiar formulas.
In what follows, we provide a characterization of the volume-ranking that re-
sults from merging the standard measurement-theoretic treatment of the volume
as an instance of a ratio scale arising from a certain extensive structure (as in e.g.
Krantz et alii (1971)) with the modern geometers’ view of the volume as a cer-
tain rigid-motion-invariant valuation (see e.g. Klain and Rota (1997)). In view of
the shared connection to extensive measurement, the present paper parallels to a
large extent Pattanaik and Xu’s article (2000) and employs all the axioms used
in the latter, namely Total Preordering, Non-Triviality, Independence, Denseness
and the Archimedean property, which are the standard requirements for obtaining
ratio scales representing ordered extensive structures. Then, in order to provide a
characterization of (polycon(n),<V ), the following properties are to be introduced.
Total Preorder (TP): Let D be a non empty subset of P (Rn),t h ep o w e r
set of X,s u c ht h a t∅ ∈ D. A binary relational system (D, <) is a total
preordered set if and only if it satisﬁes:
i) Totality: For any A,B ∈ D, A < B or B < A and
ii) Transitivity: For any A,B,C ∈ D,i fA < B and B < C then A < C.7
Non-triviality (NT): Let D be a non empty subset of P (Rn) such that
∅ ∈ D. A binary relational system (D,<) satisﬁes non-triviality if and
only if there exists an A ∈ D such that A Â ∅ and B < ∅ for any B ∈ D.
Denseness (D): Let D be a non empty subset of P (Rn) such that ∅ ∈ D.
A binary relational system (D,<) satisﬁes denseness if and only if, for any
A,B ∈ D\{∅}, such that A < B there exists an A0 ∈ D\{∅} such that
A0 ⊆ A and A0 ∼ B.
Independence (I): Let D be a non empty subset of P (Rn) such that ∅ ∈
D, and for any A ∈ D, kD(A)=∩{B ∈ D : A ⊆ B} if {B ∈ D : A ⊆ B}
6= ∅ and undeﬁned otherwise. A binary relational system (D,<) satisﬁes
6Recall that a translation on Rn is a function τ : Rn → Rn such that there exists a y ∈ Rn
with τ (x)=x + y for all x ∈ Rn.
7We respectively denote with Â and ∼ the asymmetric and symmetric components of <.8
independence if and only if, for any A,B,C ⊆ Rn, such that kD(A ∪ C)
and kD(B ∪ C) are well deﬁned, and kD(A ∩ C) ∼ kD(B ∩ C) ∼ ∅,
kD(A) < kD(B) ⇐⇒ kD(A ∪ C) < kD(B ∪ C).
Archimedean Property (A): Let D be a non empty subset of P (Rn) such
that ∅ ∈ D. A transitive binary relational system (D,<) satisﬁes the
Archimedean property if and only if, for any A,B ∈ D,i fA Â B Â ∅ then
there exists a positive integer m and B1,..., Bm ∈ D such that B1 ∼ ... ∼
Bm ∼ B and B ∪ B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bm < A.
For interpretation and discussion of the TP, NT, D, I, A properties, we refer
to the work of Pattanaik and Xu (2000). The new axioms we introduce here are
precisely those required for the valuation-theoretic characterization of volume of
polyconvex sets, namely Simplicity and Translation Invariance.
Simplicity (S): Let D be a non empty subset of P (Rn) such that ∅ ∈ D.
A binary relational system (D,<) satisﬁes simplicity if and only if A ∼ ∅,
for any A ∈ D, such that dimA<n .
Translation Invariance (TI): Let D be a non empty subset of P (Rn).A
binary relational system (D,<) satisﬁes translation invariance if and only
if, for any A ∈ D and any translation τ on Rn,i fτ (A) ∈ D then A ∼ τ (A).
Simplicity is a full dimensionality requirement for non-bottom opportunity sets.
As mentioned above, it amounts to an extremely strong minimum threshold for
opportunity sets: in order to be valuable, i.e. strictly more valuable than the null
set, an opportunity set must include a positive amount of each characteristic. Of
course, this is only plausible if each dimension of the opportunity space does indeed
represent a basic/primary characteristic.
Translation Invariance requires the ranking to be insensitive to location in space
of the opportunity set with respect to a ﬁxed reference frame. This is of course
preposterous if the given ranking is meant to reﬂect some special, ﬁxed preferences
but is, we submit, a quite natural requirement when assessing freedom of choice as
such.
In order to proceed to our characterization, we shall rely on two basic lemmas,
namely:




is a polyconvex dissection of A ∪ B.
Lemma 2. i) Let A,B ∈ polycon(n) such that B ⊆ A.I f (polycon(n),<) is a
totally preordered set that satisﬁes I,t h e nA Â B if and only if kpol(A\B) Â ∅;
ii) let A,B ∈ polycon(n) such that B ⊆ A.I f (polycon(n),<) is a totally
preordered set that satisﬁes I and NT,t h e nA < B;
iii) let A,B,C,D ∈ polycon(n).I f (polycon(n),<) is a totally preordered set
that satisﬁes I and NT, A ∼ C , B ∼ D and (A ∩ B) ∼ (C ∩ D) ∼ ∅,t h e n
A ∪ B ∼ C ∪ D.9
We shall also use a basic theorem on extensive measurement concerning extensive
structures with no essential maximum as deﬁned below (see Krantz et al.(1971)):
Deﬁnition 4. An extensive structure with no essential maximum is a tuple (X,<
,B,◦) such that:
(1) X is a non-empty set,
(2) ∅ 6= B ⊆ X × X,a n d
(3) ◦ : X × X Xis a binary partial operation with domain B such that:
i): (total preorder): (X,<) is a totally preordered set, i.e. < is a total and
transitive binary relation on X;
ii): (local associativity): for any x,y,z ∈ X,i f(x,y) ∈ B and (x◦y,z) ∈ B,
then (y,z) ∈ B, (x,y ◦ z) ∈ B,a n d(x ◦ y) ◦ z < x ◦ (y ◦ z);
iii): (local commutative monotonicity): for any x,y,z ∈ X,i f(x,z) ∈ B
and x < y then (z,y) ∈ B and x ◦ z < z ◦ y;
iv): (solvability): for any x,y ∈ X,i fx Â y then there exists z ∈ X such
that (y,z) ∈ B and x < y ◦ z;
v): (positivity): for any x,y ∈ X,i f(x,y) ∈ B,t h e nx ◦ y Â x;
vi): (ﬁniteness of strictly bounded standard sequences): for any se-
quence (xi)
k6∞
i=1 in X,i f(xi)
k6∞
i=1 is standard, (i.e. such that xi = xi−1◦x1,
i =2 ,...,k), and bounded, (i.e. there exists y ∈ X such y Â xi , i =
1,...,k), then k is a ﬁnite integer.
4. Characterization of the volume-ranking
Let us now proceed to state the main result of this paper, namely:
Theorem 1. Let (polycon(n),<) be a binary relational system. Then <=<V if and
only if < is a total transitive relation (i.e. a total preorder) and (polycon(n),<)
satisﬁes N T ,D ,A ,I ,Sand TI.
Theorem 1 captures a ‘freedom of choice’-based ranking of polycon(n),w h e nt h e
‘size’ of an opportunity set is assessed by its volume.8 It is worth noticing that the
volume-characterization provided by Theorem 1 is tight. To see this, consider the
following examples:
Example 1 (Totality): Independence of the totality requirement is immediately
shown by considering the binary relational system (polycon(n),>◦
π),d e ﬁned as
follows: for any A,B ∈ polycon(n), A >◦
π B if and only if either A> ◦
π B or A ∼◦
π B
where A> ◦
π B if and only if there exists k ∈ Z, k ≥ 1 such that vol(A)−vol(B)=kπ
and A ∼◦
π B if and only if vol(A)=vol(B).
Example 2 (Transitivity): Independence of the transitivity requirement can
be shown by the binary relational system (polycon(n),>π),d e ﬁned as follows: for
any A,B ∈ polycon(n), A >π B if and only if either A> π B or A ∼π B where
A> π B if and only if there exists k ∈ Z, k ≥ 1 such that vol(A) − vol(B)=kπ
and A ∼π B if and only if neither A> π B nor B> π A.
8Incidentally, it should be noticed that virtually all the axioms we are considering are trivially
satisﬁed on the restricted domain of linear budget sets as considered by Xu (2004). It is still to
be seen under which amendments, if at all, the axiom-set proposed by Xu himself in the paper
mentioned above might still provide (part of) a characterization of the volume-ranking on the
polyconvex domain.10
Example 3 (NT): To prove independence of the NT property from the other
conditions, let us consider the binary relational system
¡
polycon(n),R U¢
,w h e r e
RU is the universal binary relation on polycon(n), i.e. RU = polycon(n)×polycon(n).
Example 4 (D): To establish independence of the D property from the others
let us introduce the binary relational system (polycon(n),>D),d e ﬁned as follows:

























or (iii)d i mB<n .
Example 5 (I): To check independence of the I property from the other con-
ditions, consider the binary relation system (polycon(n),<d) with <d deﬁned as
follows: for any A,B ∈ polycon(n), A <d B if and only if d(A) > d(B) where
d : polycon(n) → {0,1} is a function deﬁned by the following rule: d(A)= ½
1 if dimA = n
0 if dimA<n .
A special attention has to be deserved to the following example in which we show
that Archimedean property is violated, but NT, D, I, TI, S, TP are satisﬁed.
Example 6 (A) In order to establish independence of the Archimedean property
let us consider the following example. Let N be the set of natural numbers and U a
free ultraﬁlter in the (boolean) lattice (P(N),⊆), i.e. a nonempty proper subset of
P(N) (the power set of N) such that i) for any X ⊆ Y ⊆ N if X ∈ U then Y ∈ U,
ii) X ∩ Y ∈ U for any X,Y ∈ U, iii) for any X ⊆ N either X ∈ U or N\X ∈ U,
and iv)
\
{X : X ∈ U}= ∅.9
Now, consider the binary relational system (polycon(n),<U) deﬁned as follows.




i zi = vol(A) where z ∈ (0,1) ⊆ R , and denote (aA
i )i∈N
the corresponding sequence of coeﬃcients. Then, for any A,B ∈ polycon(n),d e ﬁne
A <U B iﬀ
©




∈ U (where ‘>’ denotes the natural order of the
reals). In particular, we may consider for the sake of simplicity the case n =1
i.e. the real line. It is easily checked that the polyconvex sets on the real line are
precisely the ﬁnite unions of closed intervals and their volumes obviously reduce to
the sums of their lengths.
The binary relational system (polycon(1),<U) is indeed a totally preordered set:
<U is total because > is total, and for any X ⊆ N either X ∈ U or N\X ∈ U,a n d
transitive because X ∩ Y ∈ U for any X,Y ∈ U,b yd e ﬁnition of an ultraﬁlter.
To see that (polycon(1),<U) is non-trivial just consider any closed interval A
such that aA





i = k ∈ R+\{0} for each i), while simplicity of (polycon(1),<U) follows
from the fact that the volume of a zero-dimensional closed interval i.e. a point is
zero hence a point is by deﬁnition ∼U-indiﬀerent to ∅. Also, it is easily checked that
(polycon(1),<U) is translation-invariant since lengths are translation-invariant. To
check denseness of (polycon(1),<U),t a k ea n yp a i rA,B of closed intervals such that
9See e.g. Skala (1975) for a short introduction to ultraﬁlters and ultraproducts.11








i ,a n daA0
i = aA
i otherwise.
Moreover, (polycon(1),<U) satisﬁes independence: indeed let A,B,C be closed
intervals such that A∩C ∼ B∩C ∼∅ . If A <U B,t h e nb yd e ﬁnition
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U, hence, since U is ∩-closed,
©






∈ U as well i.e. A ∪
C <U B∪C.C o n v e r s e l y ,i fA∪C <U B∪C then
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∈ U or equivalently A <U B.
However, (polycon(1),<U) does not satisfy the Archimedean property. To check
that, consider a pair of closed intervals A,B and a (positive) real number k such that
for any i ∈ N, aA
i = i and aB
i = k.T h e nB ÂU ∅ since
©





N ∈ U, while for any n ∈ N ,
©
i ∈ N : naB
i = nk > i = aA
i
ª
/ ∈ U because it is a
ﬁnite set (and U is a free ultraﬁlter hence by property iv) as deﬁned above no ﬁnite
set can belong to it). It follows that A ÂU B ∪ B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bn−1 for any n ∈ N and
any t-uple B1,..,Bn−1 with B ∼U Bj, j =1 ,..,n − 1.
Notice that, as it is easily checked, our example also holds in the Pattanaik and
Xu (2000) setting where opportunity sets are non-empty and compact subsets of the
non-negative orthant of a n-dimensional Euclidean real space. Hence, the foregoing
example also solves an open problem posed by Pattanaik and Xu (2000, pg. 61),
who addressed the issue of constructing an example of an ordering satisfying TP,
NT, D and I but not the Archimedean property (A), without solving it.
Example 7 (S): To prove independence of the S property from the other as-
sumptions, consider the binary relational system (polycon(n),>S),d e ﬁned as fol-
lows: for any A,B ∈ polycon(n), A >S B if and only if either dimA =d i mB and
vol(A) > vol(B),o rdimA 6=0and dimB<n ,o rdimB =0 .
Example 8 (TI): Independence of the TI requirement can be shown by consid-
ering the binary relational system (polycon(n),>τ),d e ﬁned as follows: for any
A,B ∈ polycon(n), A >τ B if and only if either (i) vol(A) > vol(B),w i t h
A 6= B 6= A0 ∈ par⊥ (n) where dimA0 = n,o r(ii) volA = vol(B) > 0 with
A = A0 ∪ CD where CD is a closed line interval and B = B0 ∪ EF where EF is a
closed line interval and B0 ∈ par⊥ (n) with dimB0 = n and A0∩CD = B0∩EF = ∅,
or (iii)d i mB<n .
5. Conclusions
We have explored the problem of ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom
in economic contexts, where these sets are typically non-ﬁnite.I n p a r t i c u l a r , w e
have focused on opportunity sets that are ﬁnite unions of convex and compact
Euclidean sets, namely polyconvex sets. On such a large domain, we have provided a
characterization of the volume-ranking of polyconvex opportunity sets, which relies
on a basic characterization result of volume as a translation-invariant valuation as
combined with a classic theorem on extensive measurement.
The results of this paper show that at least one prominent ranking of Euclidean
opportunity sets, namely volume-ranking, is amenable to a rather simple charac-
terizations based on the foregoing ideas when applied to the domain of polyconvex
sets. When it comes to interpretation, however, there is apparently some tension
between such a broad polyconvex domain and the Simplicity axiom, which is in
a sense the hallmark of the volume-ranking, asking for indiﬀerence between the12
empty set and any non full-dimensional opportunity set. In fact, as noticed above
in the text, while opportunity sets attached to indivisible goods are allowed in the
(Euclidean) polyconvex domain, Simplicity forces indiﬀerence between any such op-
portunity set and the empty set. But then, our valuation-based characterization of
the volume-ranking provides us with an obvious and promising suggestion: look for
rankings violating Simplicity, which are induced by a suitable non-simple valuation
on the polyconvex domain! We leave it as a possible topic for another paper.
Moreover, it should also be recalled that many models of considerable interest
rely on inﬁnite horizons hence typically on inﬁnite-dimensional spaces. Now, while
distance-based rankings of opportunity sets are at least in principle easily lifted into
inﬁnite-dimensional spaces that is not so for the volume-ranking. However, new
rankings induced by suitable valuations other than the volume might conceivably
be identiﬁed and singled out for further analysis. Admittedly, this might prove
to be not an easy task since apparently very little is known about valuations in
inﬁnite-dimensional spaces, but we regard it as a quite interesting topic for further
research.
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6. Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .First, notice that
kpol(A\B) ∪ kpol(B\A) ∪ (A ∩ B) ⊇ (A\B) ∪ (B\A) ∪ (A ∩ B)=A ∪ B,
while
kpol(A\B) ∪ kpol(B\A) ∪ (A ∩ B)=( kpol(A\B) ∪ (A ∩ B)) ∪
∪(kpol(B\A) ∪ (A ∩ B)) ⊆ kpol((A\B) ∪ (A ∩ B)) ∪
∪kpol((B\A) ∪ (A ∩ B)) = A ∪ B,
i.e.
kpol(A\B) ∪ kpol(B\A) ∪ (A ∩ B)=A ∪ B
Let us now consider kpol(A\B) ∩ (A ∩ B) and suppose that there exists a n-
dimensional ball S with a (ﬁnite) positive radius such that S ⊆ kpol(A\B)∩(A∩B).
C l e a r l y ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tS ∩ (A\B)=∅, i.e. S ⊆ kpol(A\B)\(A\B).13
But then, a convex compact S0 c a nb ec h o s e ns u c ht h a tS\S0 6= ∅ and A\B ⊆
(kpol(A\B)∩S0) ⊂ kpol(A\B), a contradiction since kpol(A\B)∩S0 is indeed poly-
convex. Therefore, int(kpol(A\B) ∩ (A ∩ B)) = ∅ and by a similar argument
int(kpol(B\A) ∩ (A ∩ B)) = ∅.
Now, suppose there exists a n-dimensional ball S with (ﬁnite) positive radius such
that S ⊆ kpol(A\B)∩kpol(B\A). If S ⊆ kpol(A\B)\(A\B) or S ⊆ kpol(B\A)\(B\A),
a contradiction follows, by the foregoing argument. Thus, it must be the case
that both S ∩ kpol(A\B) ∩ (A\B) 6= ∅ and S ∩ kpol(B\A) ∩ (B\A) 6= ∅, hence
kpol(A\B) ∩ (B\A) 6= ∅ and kpol(B\A) ∩ (A\B) 6= ∅.B u t t h e n e . g .A\B ⊆
kpol(A\B) ∩ A ⊂ kpol(A\B), a contradiction since kpol(A\B) ∩ A is a polyconvex





is indeed a polyconvex dissection
of A ∪ B. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .i) Let A,B ∈ polycon(n), such that B ⊆ A and A Â B, i.e.
kpol((A\B) ∪ B)=kpol(A)=A Â B = ∅ ∪ B = kpol(∅ ∪ B).
Now,
kpol(B ∩ (A\B)) = B ∩ (A\B)=∅ = B ∩ ∅
hence, by I, kpol(A\B) < ∅.
If ∅ < kpol(A\B) as well then, by I again,
B = kpol(B)=kpol(∅ ∪ B) < kpol((A\B) ∪ B)=A,
a contradiction.
Therefore, kpol(A\B) Â ∅.
Conversely, let A,B ∈ polycon(n), such that B ⊆ A and kpol(A\B) Â ∅.
Then, since kpol(∅)=∅ and B ∩ (A\B)=∅ = B ∩ ∅, I entails
A = kpol((A\B) ∪ B) < kpol(B)=B.
If B < A as well, then kpol(∅ ∪ B)=B < A = kpol((A\B) ∪ B), hence by I again
∅ < kpol(A\B),ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Thus, A Â B as required.
ii) By NT, kpol(A\B) < ∅ = kpol(∅).S i n c eB ∩ (A\B)=∅ = B ∩ ∅, I entails
A = kpol((A\B) ∪ B) < kpol(∅ ∪ B)=kpol(B)=B.
iii) Let A,B,C,D ∈ polycon(n) such that (A ∩ B) ∼ (C ∩ D) ∼ ∅, A ∼ C and
B ∼ D,a n dd e ﬁne A0 = A\D and D0 = D\A.
Since by deﬁnition C ∩ D0 ⊆ C ∩ D ∼ ∅, NT and point ii) above entail
C ∩ D0 ∼ ∅.
Also, A∩D0 = ∅ by deﬁnition. Hence, by I, kpol(A∪D0) ∼ kpol(C∪D0),b e c a u s e
kpol(A)=A ∼ C = kpol(C).B u t A ∪ kpol(D0) and C ∪ kpol(D0) are polyconvex
sets, hence by the deﬁnition of polyconvex hull, kpol(A ∪ D0)=A ∪ kpol(D0) and
kpol(C ∪ D0)=C ∪ kpol(D0).
It follows that A ∪ kpol(D0) ∼ C ∪ kpol(D0).
Similarly, by deﬁnition, A0 ∩ D = ∅ and A0 ∩ B ⊆ A ∩ B ∼ ∅, whence by point
ii) above, NT,a n dI, kpol(B)=B ∼ D = kpol(D) entails
kpol(A0) ∪ B = kpol(A0 ∪ B) ∼ kpol(A0 ∪ D)=kpol(A0) ∪ D.14
B u tn o t i c et h a tb yd e ﬁnition A ∪ D0 = A ∪ D = A0 ∪ D, hence
A ∪ kpol(D0)=kpol(A ∪ D0)=kpol(A0 ∪ D)=kpol(A0) ∪ D,
and therefore
kpol(A0) ∪ B = kpol(A0 ∪ B) ∼ kpol(A0 ∪ D)=
= kpol(A ∪ D0) ∼ kpol(C ∪ D0)=
= C ∪ kpol(D0).
Moreover,
(A0 ∪ B) ∩ (A ∩ D)=( A0 ∩ (A ∩ D)) ∪ (B ∩ (A ∩ D)) ⊆ (A ∩ B) ∼ ∅,
and
(C ∪ D0) ∩ (A ∩ D)=( C ∩ (A ∩ D)) ∪ (D0 ∩ (A ∩ D)) ⊆ (C ∩ D) ∼ ∅.
Thus, by NT and point ii) above, and by the deﬁnition of polyconvex hull
kpol((A0 ∪ B) ∩ (A ∩ D)) ∼ ∅
and
kpol((C ∪ D0) ∩ (A ∩ D)) ∼ ∅.
Therefore, by I
kpol((A0 ∪ B) ∪ (A ∩ D)) ∼ kpol((C ∪ D0) ∪ (A ∩ D)).
But
kpol((A0 ∪ B) ∪ (A ∩ D)) = kpol((A0 ∪ (A ∩ D)) ∪ B)=kpol(A ∪ B)=A ∪ B,
kpol((C ∪ D0) ∪ (A ∩ D)) = kpol(C ∪ (D0 ∪ (D ∩ A))) = kpol(C ∪ D)=C ∪ D,
whence
A ∪ B ∼ C ∪ D.
¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m .(⇒) It is easily checked that (polycon(n),<V ) is indeed a totally
preordered set that satisﬁes N T ,D ,S ,A ,Iand TI;
(⇐) Conversely, let us denote by [A]∼ the <-indiﬀerence class of A, for any A ∈








([A]∼,[B]∼):A Â ∅,BÂ ∅, and there exist A0 ∈ [A]∼,B0 ∈ [B]∼
s.t. A0 ∩ B0 ∼ ∅
¾
and for any ([A]∼,[B]∼) ∈ B deﬁne
[A]∼ ◦ [B]∼ =[ A ∪ B]∼ifA ∩ B ∼ ∅.
It is immediately checked that B 6= ∅.B y NT there exists a A ∈ polycon(n)
such that A Â ∅. Thus, take a translation τ such that A ∩ τ(A)=∅. By TI,
τ(A) ∼ A Â ∅, hence (A,τ(A)) ∈ B.15
Notice that ◦ is well-deﬁned. To check that, take any C,D ∈ polycon(n) such
that C ∼ A, D ∼ B. Then, take any translation τ such τ(C) ∩ D = ∅. It follows
that:
[C]∼ ◦ [D]∼ =[ τ(C) ∪ D]∼ =[ τ(C)]∼ ◦ [D]∼ =[ A]∼ ◦ [B]∼.
Finally, for any [A]∼,[B]∼ ∈ polycon(n)
◦,p o s i t
[A]∼ <∗ [B]∼ ⇐⇒ A < B.
Then (polycon(n)
◦,B,<∗,◦) turns out to be an extensive structure with no
essential maximum.
Indeed, (polycon(n)
◦,<∗) is a totally preordered set, in particular, it is an
antisymmetric totally preordered set, i.e. a totally ordered set, by construction,
since (polycon(n),<) is a totally preordered set.
To check associativity, for any ([A]∼,[B]∼),([A]∼,[B]∼ ◦ [C]∼) ∈ B just take a
suitable pair of translations τ1,τ2,τ3,τ4 such that
τ1(B) ∩ τ2(C)=τ3(A) ∩ τ4(B ∪ C)) = τ3(A) ∩ τ1(B)=τ3(A) ∩ τ2(C)=∅.
Since clearly, by TI, B ∈ [τ1(B)]∼, C ∈ [τ2(C)]∼, A ∈ [τ3(A)]∼, B ∪ C ∈
[τ4(B ∪ C)]∼, it follows that both ([B]∼,[C]∼) ∈ B and ([A]∼,[B ∪ C]∼) ∈ B.
Notice that the foregoing translations do exist by compactness of polyconvex sets.
Moreover,
([A]∼ ◦ [B]∼) ◦ [C]∼ =[ τ3(A) ∪ τ1(B)]∼ ◦ [τ2(C)]∼ =
=[ ( τ3(A) ∪ τ1(B)) ∪ τ2(C)]∼ =
=[ τ3(A) ∪ (τ1(B) ∪ τ2(C))]∼ =
=[ τ3(A)]∼ ◦ ([τ1(B)]∼ ◦ [τ2(C)]∼)=
=( [ A]∼) ◦ ([B]∼ ◦ [C]∼).
As for monotonicity, assume ([A]∼,[C]∼) ∈ B and [A]∼ <∗ [B]∼. Clearly, again,
there exist translations τ,τ0 such that τ(B)∩τ0(C)=∅, whence ([B]∼,[C]∼) ∈ B.
Also, take a further translation τ00 such that τ00(A)∩τ0(C)=∅. Then, by I and
transitivity of <,
[A]∼ ◦ [C]∼ =[ τ00(A) ∪ τ0(C)]∼ <∗ [τ(B) ∪ τ0(C)]∼ =
=[ τ(B)]∼ ◦ [τ0(C)]∼ =[ B]∼ ◦ [C]∼.
To check that ‘solvability’ holds, let us consider any [A]∼,[B]∼ ∈ polycon(n)
◦
such that [A]∼ Â∗ [B]∼. Hence A Â B, and thus by D there exists a non-empty
A0 ⊆ A such that A0 ∼ B. Now, there must exist a translation τ such that
τ(A0)∩kpol(A\A0)=∅.T h u s ,s i n c eo fc o u r s eB ∼ τ(A0), ([B]∼,[kpol(A\A0)]∼) ∈ B
and [A]∼ =[ A0 ∪ kpol(A\A0)]∼ =[ τ(A0)]∼ ◦ [kpol(A\A0)]∼ =[ B]∼ ◦ [kpol(A\A0)]∼.
Coming to ‘positivity’, consider any [A]∼,[B]∼ ∈ polycon(n)
◦ such that ([A]∼,[B]∼) ∈
B, and any translation τ such that A∩τ(B)=∅. Clearly, [A]∼◦[B]∼ =[ A∪τ(B)]∼.
Since τ(B) ⊆ A∪τ(B), A∪τ(B) Â τ(B) if and only if kpol((A∪τ(B))\τ(B)) Â ∅
by Lemma 2.i above.
Now, kpol((A ∪ τ(B))\τ(B)) = kpol(A)=A Â ∅,b yc o n s t r u c t i o n .
It follows that A ∪ τ(B) Â τ(B), hence
[A]∼ ◦ [B]∼ =[ A ∪ τ(B)]∼ Â∗ [τ(B)]∼ =[ B]∼
by TI.16
It remains to be shown that every strictly bounded standard sequence is ﬁnite,
which follows immediately from A.
Therefore, according to the classic construction of ratio scales for extensive struc-
tures with no essential maximum (see Krantz et alii (1971), Theorem 3.3, p. 85),
there exists a (positive) real-valued function ϕ : polycon(n)
◦ → R+ such that
ϕ([A]∼) > ϕ([B]∼) if and only if [A]∼ <∗ [B]∼,
for any [A]∼,[B]∼ ∈ polycon(n)
◦,a n d
ϕ([A]∼ ◦ [B]∼)=ϕ([A]∼)+ϕ([B]∼),
for any ([A]∼,[B]∼) ∈ B.
In particular, ϕ is uniquely deﬁned up to positive linear transformations.
Then, deﬁne f : polycon(n) → R by the following rule:
f(A)=ϕ([A]∼) if [A]∼ 6=[ ∅]∼,a n d
f(A)=0 if [A]∼ =[ ∅]∼,
for any A ∈ polycon(n).
Next, we shall prove that f is indeed a valuation on the lattice Polycon(n).T o
show this, we can either proceed by a direct proof or invoke a general fact involving
restrictions of measures. We shall proceed by a direct proof. Thus, consider any
A,B ∈ polycon(n).I fA Â ∅ and B ∼ ∅ then (A ∩ B) ∼ ∅ by NT and Lemma
2.ii. Moreover, by Lemma 2.iii, A∪B ∼ A∪∅ = A Â ∅,t h u sf (A ∪ B)=f (A)=
f (A)+f (B) − f (A ∩ B) since by deﬁnition f (B)=f (A ∩ B)=0 . A similar
argument applies to the case B Â ∅ and A ∼ ∅.I fA ∼ B ∼ ∅ then A∪B ∼ ∅ by
Lemma 2.iii, hence f (A ∪ B)=0=f (A)+f (B)−f (A ∩ B). Therefore, we may
assume that both A Â ∅ and B Â ∅. By a similar argument, we may also assume
without loss of generality that kpol(A\B) Â ∅,kpol(B\A) Â ∅ and A ∩ B Â ∅.
Then,
f(A ∪ B)=f(kpol(A\B) ∪ kpol(B\A) ∪ (A ∩ B)) =
= ϕ([kpol(A\B) ∪ kpol(B\A) ∪ (A ∩ B)]∼).






dim(kpol(A\B) ∩ (A ∩ B)),











kpol(A\B) ∩ kpol(B\A) ∼ kpol(A\B) ∩ (A ∩ B) ∼ kpol(B\A) ∩ (A ∩ B) ∼ ∅.
Of course, by Lemma 2.ii,
(A ∩ B) ∩ (kpol(A\B)) ∩ ((A ∩ B) ∩ (kpol(B\A)) ∼ ∅.
Thus, by Lemma 2.iii above,
(A ∩ B) ∩ (kpol(A\B) ∪ kpol(B\A)) =
=( ( A ∩ B) ∩ (kpol(A\B)) ∪ ((A ∩ B) ∩ (kpol(B\A))) ∼ ∅17
It follows that, by deﬁnition of ◦,a s s o c i a t i v i t yo f◦, and additivity of ϕ over B
f(A ∪ B)=ϕ([kpol(A\B)∼ ∪ kpol(B\A)∼ ∪ (A ∩ B)]∼)=
= ϕ(([kpol(A\B) ∪ kpol(B\A)]∼) ◦ [A ∩ B]∼)=
= ϕ(([kpol(A\B) ∪ kpol(B\A)]∼)) + ϕ([A ∩ B]∼)=
= ϕ(([kpol(A\B)]∼ ◦ [kpol(B\A)]∼)) + ϕ([A ∩ B]∼)=
= ϕ([kpol(A\B)]∼)+ϕ([kpol(B\A)]∼)+ϕ([A ∩ B]∼),
whence: f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)=( ϕ([kpol(A\B)]∼)+ϕ([A∩B]∼))+(ϕ([kpol(B\A)]∼)+
ϕ([A ∩ B]∼)) = (ϕ([kpol(A\B)]∼ ◦ [A ∩ B]∼)) + (ϕ([kpol(B\A)]∼ ◦ [A ∩ B]∼)) =
(ϕ([kpol(A\B)∪(A∩B)]∼)+ϕ([kpol(B\A)∪(A∩B)]∼)=ϕ([kpol(A)]∼)+ϕ([kpol(B)]∼)=
ϕ([A]∼)+ϕ([B]∼)=f(A)+f(B), as claimed.
Moreover, from S it follows that f is in particular a simple valuation (because
for any A ∈ polycon(n), dimA<nentails A ∼ ∅, hence f(A)=0 ), while TI
entails that it is translation invariant as well (because for any translation τ and
any A ∈ polycon(n), τA ∼ A entails f(τ(A)) = ϕ([τ(A)]∼)=ϕ([A]∼)=f(A)).
Thus, f : polycon(n) → R is an isotone, simple and translation invariant valuation
such that, for any A,B ∈ polycon(n), A < B if and only if f (A) > f (B). Then,
since f is in particular monotonic, there exists (by Theorem 8.1.1 in Klain and Rota
(1997)) a c ∈ R such that for any A ∈ polycon(n), f (A)=c · vol(A). It follows
that c>0 since both f and vol are isotone and non-constant valuations. Hence,
for any A,B ∈ polycon(n), A < B if and only if c · vol(A) ≥ c · vol(B) i.e., if and
only if vol(A) ≥ vol(B). It follows that <=<V as required. ¤
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